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• Exportsandimportsadjustedsigniﬁcantly
to the appreciation of the Canadian dollar
in 2003 and 2004. Other factors, such as
global and sector-speciﬁc shocks, competi-
tion from emerging economies, and con-
straints on the domestic supply of a few
products also affected exports and imports
over that period.
• Exports and imports of machinery and
equipment and non-automotive consumer
goods, as well as imports of non-energy
raw materials, appear to have been the
most affected by the currency appreciation.
• Econometric models suggest that, by the
end of 2004, the drag on exports exerted by
the appreciation would have offset more
than half of  the stimulus provided by the
growth of U.S. demand since the end of
2002.Aswell,theappreciationwouldhave
accounted for about 60 per cent of the total
increase in imports over the same period.
• Model simulations signal that the
adjustmenttotheappreciationexperienced
over 2003 and 2004 should have started
tapering off in the ﬁrst half of 2005,
thereby lending support to economic
growth in the short term.
ovements in the exchange rate affect the
economy through multiple channels, but it
is through international trade that their
effect is felt most directly. Yet, isolating the
speciﬁc contribution of exchange rate movements to
the growth of exports and imports is a daunting task,
not least because of the volatility in trade flows and
the difﬁculty accounting for the many cyclical, struc-
tural, and sector-speciﬁc factors that affect them at any
moment. In this article, we evaluate what this contri-
bution might have been over 2003 and 2004, in the
midst of one of the sharpest movements of the Canadian
dollar in history.
We begin by identifying the main factors that might
have masked the true impact of the currency apprecia-
tion on export and import volumes, including shifts in
the composition of demand, sector-specific shocks,
constraints on domestic supply, and competition from
emerging-market economies.1 We then use this pre-
liminary analysis to interpret the evidence of exchange
rate effects, ﬁrst as signalled by the time path of the
ratios of exports or imports to activity variables, and
then as estimated by econometric models that control
for business-cycle developments, exchange rate move-
ments, and trends in international trade. Only these
models can provide statistically valid estimates of the
contribution of the Canadian-dollar appreciation to
the recent developments in exports and imports.
These estimates are specific to a particular model,
however, and are subject to a considerable margin of
error. As such, they are only meant to be taken as ten-
tative, pending more information and better models.
1.   In reality, some of these factors may not be entirely independent of
exchange rate movements. For simplicity, however, they are treated as such in
this article.
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Recent Movements of the Canadian
Dollar in Perspective
Following almost a decade of general depreciation
against the currencies of Canada’s major trading part-
ners, the Canadian dollar appreciated abruptly during
2003 and 2004 (Chart 1). The dollar shot up by just
over 17 per cent against a trade-weighted basket of
currencies2 during 2003 and by nearly 7 per cent during
2004, mostly in the latter half of the year. The appreci-
ation was slightly more pronounced against the U.S.
dollar. Only once in the past three decades has there
been an appreciation of the Canadian dollar of similar
magnitude. However, the previous rally unfolded
over ﬁve years, from 1987 to 1991, and was therefore
much less abrupt than the most recent surge.
Exports
As a result of a recession in the United States, exports
of goods faltered in 2001, with a sharp reduction in
shipments of machinery and equipment (M&E) and
automotive products, which together account for
roughly 40 per cent of total exports (Table 1). The
slump in M&E exports dragged on to 2002, offsetting
much of the rebound in most other components that
accompanied an uneven recovery in the United States.
As the Canadian dollar started to climb relative to
other currencies in 2003, renewed weakness affected
virtually all major export categories even as the U.S.
upturn was gathering momentum. Among the hardest
2.   The basket consists of the euro (6.0 per cent), yen (5.3 per cent), pound
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hit were industrial goods and materials, M&E, and
automotive products. The year 2004 saw a broad-based
rebound, thanks to strong gains in the first two quarters.
Several major categories of exports enjoyed growth
rates close to, or even exceeding, the average annual
growth in the late 1990s.
Sources of weakness
The geographic focus and product
composition of Canada’s exports
contributed to strengthen rather than
to weaken export growth in recent
years, particularly in 2004.
Since 2001, Canadian export volumes have grown at
a much slower pace than the volume of imports in
advanced countries,3 with a marked widening of the
gap in 2003 and 2004 (Table 2). Unfavourable composi-
tion effects played no role in this pattern, since the
geographic focus and product composition of Can-
ada’s exports contributed to strengthen rather than
3.   As deﬁned by the International Monetary Fund, advanced countries con-
sist of 29 countries capturing about 95 per cent of Canadian exports.
Total exports1 9.3 -3.0 1.0 -2.1 5.0
Goods 9.5 -3.4 0.8 -1.8 5.4
Energy products (7.3) 4.0 2.0 3.9 -1.7 3.1
Other commodities2 (30.8) 5.7 -0.4 1.8 -2.9 6.7
Machinery and equipment (21.4) 16.5 -7.5 -5.8 -4.8 6.0
Of which:
Telecom equipment n/a -39.6 -18.9 -6.4 13.3
Aircraft and parts n/a 18.0 -11.4 -2.0 -2.8
Auto products (20.0) 9.5 -8.7 3.5 -2.1 6.9
Other consumer goods (3.5) 11.2 5.4 7.8 -2.3 0.5
Services 7.9 0.4 2.3 -4.0 2.5
Travel (3.3) 5.0 1.3 1.7 -10.4 12.1
Transportation (2.0) 4.9 -6.0 1.6 -9.6 8.7
Commercial (6.7) 10.7 2.0 3.5 1.4 -3.6
Table 1
Annual Growth Rate in the Volume of Canadian
Exports by Product
Per cent
Average of 2001 2002 2003 2004
1996–2000
1. 2004 share of total exports shown in brackets
2. Includes agricultural and ﬁsh products, forestry products, and industrial goods and
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to weaken export growth in recent years, particularly
in 2004. Indeed, total imports by the United States,
Canada’s largest market by far, grew comparatively
quickly, and those imports shifted towards products
that have a relatively large weight in Canadian exports,
notably non-oil commodities. The appreciation of the
Canadian dollar likely played a key role in the relative
weakness of the Canadian exports, but several other
factors may have also contributed to it.
Shocks and supply constraints
One consequence of product specialization is that it
makes a country vulnerable to unfavourable shocks in
particular sectors. Two such shocks, of global dimen-
sion, have had disproportionate effects on Canadian
exports in recent years: the worldwide collapse of the
telecommunications equipment industry in 2001, fol-
lowed by a gradual recovery that only began in 2004;
and the contraction of demand for aircrafts and parts
in the aftermath of the 11 September terrorist attacks,
with no steady recovery by the end of 2004 (Table 1).
These shocks had considerably more impact on
Canadian exports than on U.S. imports of M&E because
of the much larger weights of telecommunications
equipment and  aircrafts and parts in Canadian exports
than in U.S. imports of M&E.
Geographic composition
U.S. imports -2.7 3.4 4.6 10.7
Actual  imports of advanced countries1 -0.8 2.6 4.0 8.8
Weighted  imports of advanced countries2 -2.5 3.3 4.5 10.5
Composition effect3 -1.7 0.7 0.5 1.7
Product composition
Actual U.S. imports of selected products4 -3.6 3.5 5.6 11.8
Weighted U.S. imports of selected products5 -4.5 3.1 4.3 12.3
Composition effect6 -0.9 -0.4 -1.3 0.5
Canadian exports -3.0 1.0 -2.1 5.0
Table 2
Effects of Geographic Focus and Product
Composition on the Growth in Volume
of Canadian Exports
Per cent
2001 2002 2003 2004
1 Actual growth of the combined imports of the United States, the euro area, Japan,
the United Kingdom, and the newly industrialized Asian economies  (International
Monetary Fund)
2 Fixed-weighted growth of the combined imports of the advanced countries. The
weights are based on their average share of Canadian exports in 2001 and 2002.
3 Difference between the weighted and the actual growth of imports of advanced
countries
4 Actual growth of U.S. imports of oil, non-oil commodities, machinery and equipment,
motor vehicles and parts, and non-auto consumer goods
5 Fixed-weighted growth of U.S. imports of selected components with the weights based
on their average share of Canadian exports in 2001 and 2002
6 Difference between the weighted and the actual growth of U.S. imports
For aircrafts and parts, the shock would have contri-
uted to a marked decline in the ratio of Canadian
exports to U.S. imports of M&E right into 2003 and 2004,
adding to the effect of the Canadian-dollar apprecia-
tion on this ratio. For telecommunications equipment,
the shock would have had a similar effect in 2003 but
not in 2004. U.S. imports of telecommunications equip-
ment started recovering in 2003, but the corresponding
Canadian export resurgence only occurred in 2004.
Several other shocks have at times restrained exports.
Poorharvestsin2001and2002depressedwheatexports.
The ban on imports of Canadian cattle and beef,4 follow-
ing an incident of bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(BSE) in late May 2003, temporarily depressed meat
shipments abroad (the U.S. ban on beef was lifted in
late September 2003) and cut total live animal exports
by half. Largely as a result of the outbreak of severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) early in 2003,
exports of travel services plunged in the ﬁrst half of
that year and recovered slowly afterwards (Table 1).5
Taken together, these shocks appeared to have worked
in the same direction as the impact of the Canadian-
dollar appreciation on total exports over a good part
of 2003.
In the second half of 2004, capacity utilization rates in
some industries of the resources extraction and manu-
facturing sectors reached peak levels that had not been
seen since the 1990s or the end of the 1980s. The extent
to which this generated constraints that may have
contributed to the observed decline in exports during
this period is difﬁcult to ascertain.
Competition from emerging-market economies
The integration into the world trading system of China’s
large emerging economy adds a new dimension to
competition. China has such low production costs
relative to advanced economies like Canada that even
a sizable rise in its currency or its costs would not
prevent the country from making inroads in foreign
export markets. When this advantage is brought to
bear on a wide range of products, as is the case for
China, the result is a rapid capture of market share in
key export markets for advanced countries. As shown
in Table 3, China has gained, and Canada, along with
other areas (especially Japan and other Asian countries),
has lost shares in U.S. import markets for several
product categories since 2000, including M&E, non-
4.   Beef refers to the meat from cattle and does not include live animals.
5. There was also a sharp decline in exports (and imports) in August 2003 at
the time of the electricity blackout in Ontario. It was reversed in September
but still depressed the quarterly total signiﬁcantly.8 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2005
Canadian-dollar appreciation on exports could still
have been substantial.
Isolating the exchange rate effect
The changing product composition of U.S. imports
and Canadian exports primarily reﬂects variations in
the structure of aggregate demand and production in
the United States as a result of cyclical and structural
forces. By relating broad Canadian export groupings
to specific components of U.S. aggregate demand or
supply, it may be possible to isolate the effects of
exchange rate variations.
The substantial rise in U.S.-dollar
commodity prices in 2003 and 2004
has made it proﬁtable for Canadian
producers to export commodities in
spite of the Canadian-dollar
appreciation.
By that measure, only exports of M&E and non-auto-
motive consumer goods seem to have been markedly
affected by the recent appreciation of the Canadian
dollar (Charts 2 to 6). In contrast, since the second half
of 2002, exports of industrial materials have held up
relative to U.S. industrial production, with much
volatility. Because such materials are less differentiated
than end products, they offer less scope for pricing
to deviate from U.S.-dollar quotes on commodity
exchanges or competitors’ prices. Furthermore, the
substantial rise in U.S.-dollar commodity prices in
2003 and 2004 has made it profitable for Canadian
producers to export commodities in spite of the
Canadian-dollar appreciation. Exports of motor vehicles
have also remained aligned, on average, with U.S.
sales of motor vehicle units. Little exchange rate effect
on these exports is to be expected in the short term in
view of the high integration of the North American
automobile industry and the resulting geographic
specialization of production. Canadian parts producers,
on the other hand, would be expected to lose market
share as contracts are re-tendered. Exports of motor
vehicle parts did decline relative to U.S. motor vehicle
production in 2003 and 2004, but part of this movement
reﬂects an ongoing downward trend since 2001.
The evolution of broad export categories relative to
U.S. activity variables provides useful, but purely
automotive consumer goods, and semi-manufactured
products other than chemicals.6 On the assumption
that China’s cumulative gains in 2003 and 2004 with
respect to these three product categories would have
affected the other countries in proportion to their
market share for these same categories in 2002, the
impact of China’s penetration would have been to cut
the volume of Canadian exports by about 0.5 per cent
in 2003 and by 1.0 per cent in 2004. Though not a trivial
amount, it nevertheless indicates that the effect of the
6.   One mitigating factor stems from the possibility that the total size of the
export market may have expanded in response to lower-cost products offered
by countries like China.
Machinery and equipment1 (M&E)
2000 8.6 8.8 15.2 16.6 11.4 39.3 100.0
2002 6.6 14.1 16.5 13.3 12.8 36.7 100.0
2004 5.8 21.9 15.8 11.4 11.6 33.6 100.0
Consumer goods, other than motor vehicles and parts2
2000 7.0 21.3 11.9 5.3 12.6 41.9 100.0
2002 6.3 25.3 11.6 4.2 12.3 40.3 100.0
2004 5.6 29.3 11.7 3.2 11.0 39.2 100.0
Semi-manufactured goods, excluding chemicals3
2000 22.0 8.0 20.6 7.6 8.7 33.0 100.0
2002 22.5 11.1 19.7 6.4 10.0 30.3 100.0
2004 19.8 12.9 18.4 5.3 9.3 34.3 100.0
Total4
2000 18.8 8.2 18.1 12.0 11.2 31.6 100.0
2002 18.1 10.8 19.4 10.4 11.6 29.7 100.0
2004 17.4 13.4 18.6 8.8 10.6 31.2 100.0
Table 3
Share of the Value of U.S. Imports by Source for
Selected Products
Per cent
Canada China European Japan Mexico Others Total
Union
1 M&E is deﬁned as North American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) 333
(machinery, except electrical) and 334 (computer and electronic products)
2 Consumer goods other than motor vehicles and parts are deﬁned as NAICS 313 (tex-
tiles and fabrics), 314 (textile mill products), 315 (apparel and accessories), 335 (electri-
cal equipment, appliances, and components), 337 (furniture and ﬁxtures), and 339
(miscellaneous manufactured goods)
3 Semi-manufactured goods, excluding chemicals, are deﬁned as NAICS 327 (non-metal-
lic mineral products), 331 (primary metal manufacturing), and 332 (fabricated metal
products)
4 Totals are the sum of the three product categories divided by the total U.S. imports for
the three categories.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau9 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2005
Chart 2
Ratio of Canadian Exports of Machinery
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Chart 3
Ratio of Canadian Exports of Non-Auto Consumer












2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Chart 4
Ratio of Canadian Exports of Industrial Goods and
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Chart 5
Ratio of Canadian Exports of Motor Vehicles
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circumstantial, evidence on the underlying adjust-
ment to the exchange rate appreciation. An estimated
regression model of exports may provide a firmer
basis for conclusions by more rigorously controlling
for developments in foreign business cycles, real
exchange rate movements, and trends in international
trade over a period long enough to permit valid statis-
tical inference of the relationship between exports and
exchange rates. No matter how rich the speciﬁcations
of such a model may be, however, it will make signiﬁ-
cant prediction errors over history for several reasons,
including sectoral shocks that have disproportionate
effects on exports, mismeasurement of the relevant
activity or exchange rate variables in the model, or
undetected shifts (caused by structural changes) in the
true relationship between exports and one or more of
the explanatory variables.
Box 1 describes the essential features of an estimated
aggregate export model for Canada, including the
resulting elasticities of export volumes with respect to
U.S. demand components that are intensive in imports
from Canada and to a real exchange rate, defined as
the bilateral Canada-U.S. exchange rate adjusted by
the ratio of the Canadian overall export price to the
U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) deflator. Chart 7
presents the profiles of actual and forecast exports,
alongwiththeirestimatedlong-termequilibriumvalues,
using the model described in Box 1. Exports would
have been about 2 per cent above long-term equilib-
Chart 6
Ratio of Canadian Exports of Motor Vehicle Parts
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rium by the end of 2004, consistent with a gradual
adjustment to the appreciation.
The ﬁrst wave of the Canadian-dollar
appreciation, which spanned 2003,
had its peak effect on export growth
around the end of that year. The
second wave, in the latter part of
2004, led to considerable additional
restraint on exports.
A decomposition of the model predictions reveals that
the first wave of the Canadian-dollar appreciation,
which spanned 2003, had its peak effect on export
growth around the end of that year (Table 4). The second
wave, in the latter part of 2004, led to considerable
additional restraint on exports. The model interprets
the spike in export growth in the second quarter of
2004, between the two waves of appreciation, as having
arisen largely from shocks unrelated to U.S. demand
or to exchange rate developments. Indeed, the decline
in exports over the following two quarters would
have stemmed more from a reversal of these shocks
than from the additional drag associated with the
Chart 7
Exports: Actual, Dynamic Forecast,
and Equilibrium Values
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* A number expressed in chained 1997 dollars is a measure of real value
adjusted for price changes in adjacent periods, using 1997 as a base
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second wave of appreciation. By the end of 2004, the
drag exerted by the appreciation would have offset
about 60 per cent of the stimulus provided by the
growth of U.S. demand since the end of 2002.
The predominantly negative prediction errors from
the model, as reﬂected in the residual component of
Table 4, indicate that, through much of 2003 and 2004,
exportsweredepressedbyfactorsnottakenintoaccount
by the model, including some that were discussed
before, such as Canadian vulnerability to the down-
turn in telecommunications and aircrafts, the various
ad hoc shocks that hit exports in 2003 and before, and
the loss of market share to emerging-market economies.
The negative errors also raise the possibility that exports
Box 1
An Estimated Model of Exports
The model1 used in this article relates Canadian
export volumes to components of U.S. demand, a
real exchange rate variable, and a measure of global
trade openness, within an error-correction framework.
Estimation of the model over the period 1973Q1 to






where percentage changes in exports (xt) in quarter
t are predicted by changes in U.S. consumption
(cus
t), in U.S. investment in ﬁxed capital (ius
t),  and
in U.S. exports (xus
t); by the change in inventory
investment relative to GDP ; by rela-
tive prices as measured by the ratio of the Canadian
export-price deﬂator expressed in U.S. dollars to
the U.S. GDP deﬂator 2; and by a
dummy variable for 1982Q4 (d82q4t).3 Further
inﬂuencing the forecast is the “correction” for the
most recent divergence of exports from their equi-
librium level , governed by a speed-
1.   This model was developed by Jean-Phillipe Cayen, an economist in
the Research Department of the Bank of Canada.
2.   The movements in the relative price variable are primarily driven by
those in the nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, but can also
be affected by changes in commodity prices and other factors that inﬂu-
ence the growth rates of the export price and the U.S. GDP deﬂator.
3.   This variable has no theoretical justiﬁcation. It is included only
because it helps to keep the model stable over time in the face of an
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of-adjustment parameter of 0.31. The equilibrium
level is determined by a long-run, cointegration
relation linking the level of exports to those of rela-
tive export prices, the U.S. demand components,
and global openness to trade, captured by the ratio
of exports to GDP in countries that are members of
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) (opent)4:
 (4.60) (-6.48) (0.49)
(3.30) (3.51) (4.76)
The resulting long-run elasticities of exports with
respect to real exchange rate and U.S. activity are
consistent with theoretical priors. The model was
tested for structural parameter breaks and found to
be stable.
4. A crude dummy variable to capture the effect of the Free Trade Agree-
ment was also tested but turned out to be statistically insigniﬁcant. How-
ever, this could simply indicate that the profound impact of the trade
agreement emerged only over time and could hardly be captured by a
simple dummy variable. The variable opent is kept in the equation, even if
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t × + × + ×
Relative price of exports -0.13 -0.56
U.S. consumption 1.08 0.42
U.S. investment 0.29 0.29
U.S. exports 0.12 0.35
Table B1
Key Elasticity Estimates for
Total Canadian Exports
Short run Long run
(on impact)
Total exports -1.25 -2.42  0.50  3.22  0.08  4.34 -0.70 -0.79
U.S. demand -0.10  0.54  2.38  1.55  1.93  1.60  1.52  1.76
Relative prices -0.60 -0.79 -0.74 -0.84 -0.81 -0.60 -0.93 -1.32
Trade openness  0.03  0.02 -0.02  0.03  0.08  0.09  0.12  0.09
Residual -0.58 -2.18 -1.11  2.48 -1.12  3.26 -1.41 -1.33
Table 4
Contributions of Various Factors to Quarterly
Growth in Total Exports
Per cent
2003 2004
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q412 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2005
may have responded more swiftly than in the past to
movements in the exchange rate, perhaps as a result
of the unusual abruptness of the recent appreciation
of the Canadian dollar. Such a front-loading of the
exchange rate effect should give rise to systematically
positive errors later on. The ongoing appreciation of
the dollar, however, makes it particularly difﬁcult at
present to come to any conclusion with respect to this
hypothesis.
Based on the impulse-response function, the past
appreciation of the Canadian dollar would continue
to cut into export growth during 2005, even with a
stable real exchange rate from the first quarter onwards
(Chart 8). Net of their import content, exports would
be cumulatively reduced by the equivalent of about
0.5 per cent of GDP during the year. As this drag would
diminish rapidly, the expansion of exports would tend
to accelerate, thereby lending support to economic
growth in the short term.
Imports
Following a period of strong growth from 1996 to 2000,
sharp declines were registered in 2001 for key import
categories, such as M&E, automotive products, and
industrial goods and materials (Table 5). Services
imports also fell in that year, mostly because of weak-
ness in the travel and transportation categories. Auto-
motive products recovered the following year, barely
offsetting continued declines in M&E and some other
categories. By 2003, imports had taken a decided
turn to the upside, with M&E and services contribut-
Chart 8
Effect of the Exchange Rate on Exports: Historical
Path and as Forecast by the Error-Correction Model



















ing the most. The gains were sustained and even
ampliﬁed in 2004, not least because of an acceleration
in imports of industrial goods and materials and fur-
ther momentum from M&E. While growth of goods
imports in 2003 and 2004 remained below the average
rate seen in the late 1990s, the same cannot be said of
services. Of particular note are travel and transportation
services imports, which bounced back from the effects
of earlier negative shocks to surge over the 2003–2004
period at a rate not seen since the previous episode of
Canadian-dollar appreciation (1987–1991).
While goods from the United States still account for
more than half of all Canadian imports, their share has
declined steadily in recent years (Table 6). Also losing
ground has been Japan’s share, which fell behind that
of China in 2002. The growth in goods imports from
China has since accelerated, resulting in a full 3 per-
centage point lead in import share over Japan in 2004.
Othercountries, including the European Union, also
made modest gains during the 2003–2004 period.
Total imports1 8.8 -5.1 1.5 4.1 8.1
Goods 9.8 -5.7 1.7 3.6 8.3
Energy products (3.2) 7.0 3.2 -9.5 9.5 8.7
Other commodities2 (21.8) 8.5 -2.4 3.0 1.0 7.9
Machinery and equipment (28.0) 13.3 -10.6 -5.3 4.2 12.5
Auto products (18.1) 9.3 -8.7 11.0 2.1 4.3
Other consumer goods (11.0) 9.2 2.4 8.0 8.8 8.1
Services 3.4 -2.0 0.6 6.4 7.3
Travel (4.1) 0.1 -5.5 -3.3 9.1 14.0
Transportation (3.2) 3.3 -5.9 1.7 6.3 12.3
Commercial (7.4) 5.7 1.4 2.4 5.4 2.5
Table 5
Annual Growth Rate in the Volume of Canadian
Imports, by Product
Per cent
Average of 2001 2002 2003 2004
1996–2000
1 2004 share of total imports shown in brackets
2 Includes agricultural and ﬁsh products, forestry products, and industrial goods and
materials
United States 67.0 63.6 62.6 60.7 58.8
European Union 10.1 11.5 11.4 11.9 11.8
China 2.6 3.7 4.6 5.5 6.8
Japan 4.6 4.3 4.4 4.1 3.8
Others 15.7 16.9 16.9 17.8 18.8
Table 6
Share of the Value of Canadian Imports of Goods,
by Source
Per cent
Average of 2001 2002 2003 2004
1996–200013 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2005
Sources of strength
Import volumes grew at a much faster pace than did
total demand for Canadian goods and services in 2003
and 2004 (Chart 9), an indication that the appreciation
oftheCanadiandollarmayhaveinducedashifttowards
cheaper foreign sources of supply. Factors other than
the exchange rate that could also have led to a rise in
the overall import intensity include a shift in demand
towards particularly import-intensive components,
shocks or constraints on domestic supply, and compe-
tition from emerging-market economies.
Composition of total demand
Imports of goods and services accommodate final
domestic demand, exports, and inventory investment.
They include end-products as well as the intermediate
goods and services in domestic production. Import
intensity varies considerably across the various demand
categories, depending on the tradability of the relevant
goods and services, the specialization and vertical
integration of Canadian production, and the degree of
product differentiation within the same classes of goods
and services. Investment in M&E and personal expen-
ditures on motor vehicles, other durable goods, and
semi-durable goods have relatively high import pro-
pensities compared with expenditures on services by
the personal and government sectors (Table 7). A
comparison of growth in total demand with growth in
weighted components, using import propensities7 as
7.   We are grateful to Jian-guo Cao at Finance Canada for providing us with
the estimates of import propensities for 2000 used in this article.
Chart 9
Growth Rate of Imports vs. Total Demand
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weights, indicates that the composition of demand
made little difference in 2003 but stimulated imports
moderately in 2004. Contributing to the latter were
relatively strong advances in investment in M&E,
personal expenditures on non-automotive durable
and semi-durable goods, and exports of goods and
services, all components with higher-than-average
import propensities. The fact that, over the 2003–2004
period, actual imports accelerated relative to the pace
suggested by the growth of weighted total demand
points to an intensifying effect of the Canadian-dollar
appreciation. This effect may even be greater than
implied by the rise of imports relative to weighted total
demand, inasmuch as the shift in demand towards
import-intensive components was itself prompted by
the lower import prices resulting from the appreciation
of the Canadian dollar.
Components of ﬁnal demand
Personal expenditures on:
- food, beverages, and tobacco 31.9 1.3 1.0 1.5 1.8
- electricity, natural gas, and
other fuels 20.3 -4.0 2.7 2.6 -0.9
- other non-durable goods 24.5 2.8 5.3 3.5 4.6
- semi-durable goods 40.5 4.0 4.1 3.4 5.5
- motor vehicles, repairs,
and parts 55.6 1.7 9.0 -0.6 -0.8
- other durable goods 47.2 7.8 7.8 6.3 8.9
- services other than rent 17.8 1.7 2.5 3.8 3.7
- paid and imputed rent 8.7 2.8 3.4 3.5 3.8
Investment in:
-  residential structures 21.0 10.6 14.3 6.2 8.3
-  non-residential structures 23.9 5.4 -7.3 5.7 0.8
-  machinery and equipment 71.7 -3.0 -3.3 6.4 9.8
Government expenditures
on goods and services 10.9 3.9 2.6 2.9 2.7
Government gross ﬁxed-capital
formation 36.9 11.5 8.4 4.5 4.9
Exports of goods and services 34.3 -3.0 1.0 -2.1 5.0
Investment in inventories
(year-over-year difference) 35.0 -15,762 4,146 9,306 469
Total demand 29.3 -0.2 2.7 2.5 4.2
Weighted total demand2 -1.1 2.4 2.5 5.0
Actual imports -5.1 1.5 4.1 8.1
Table 7
Annual Growth and Import




sity1 2001 2002 2003 2004
(%)
1 Estimated for 2000 (Finance Canada)
2 Fixed-weighted growth of all ﬁnal demand components with the weights based on
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in 2003 and 2004 were accompanied by declining shares
of Canadian shipments (Table 8).
Because of its substantial cost
advantage, China has made
considerable inroads in recent years,
not only in the markets for Canadian
exports, but also in the Canadian
market itself.
Isolating the Inﬂuence of the Exchange Rate
RatiosofimportstoCanadianactivityvariablessuggest
an increasing stimulus exerted by the Canadian-dollar
appreciation on non-energy raw materials, M&E, and
non-automotive consumer goods in 2003 and 2004
(Charts 10 to 14).
An estimated regression model also indicates that
exchange rate effects were important. Box 2 describes
the essential features of such a model, including the
resultingelasticitieswithrespecttodemandcomponents
and a real exchange rate, defined as the ratio of the
Canadian overall import price to the Canadian GDP
deﬂator. Chart 15 shows actual and forecast imports,
alongwiththeirestimatedlong-runequilibriumvalues.
As a share of total demand or supply1
Selected machinery and equipment (M&E) 3.0 4.9 7.8 11.1
Computer and peripheral equipment 4.6 7.2 12.8 19.7
manufacturing
Communications equipment manufacturing 2.2 4.4 6.1 6.3
Industrial machinery manufacturing 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.6
Selected consumer goods 18.0 20.8 23.1 26.5
Cut-and-sew clothing manufacturing 11.3 14.3 15.2 18.1
Footwear manufacturing 39.7 41.6 45.0 46.9
Audio-video equipment manufacturing 15.2 18.0 21.8 26.3
Sporting and athletic goods manufacturing
Doll, toy, and game manufacturing 27.1 29.2 32.4 36.6
As a share of imports from all countries
Selected M&E 5.1 7.9 12.2 17.6
Selected consumer goods 29.4 32.7 36.2 39.2
Table 8
China’s Share of Canadian Total Demand
or Supply and Imports of Selected Products
Per cent
2001 2002 2003 2004
1 Total demand or supply is approximated by the sum of apparent domestic demand or
supply plus exports, or, alternatively, by the sum of shipments and imports.
Shocks/constraints on domestic supply
Particular sectoral developments or shocks appear to
have affected imports less than exports over recent
years. Nevertheless, imports did experience shocks
that at times masked, and at other times enhanced,
the impact of the Canadian-dollar appreciation. The
uncertainties created by SARS and the war in Iraq, for
instance, delayed travel spending abroad by Canadians
in the second quarter of 2003. There was also a sharp
decline in merchandise imports in August 2003, at the
time of the electricity blackout in Ontario. The decline
was reversed in September but nonetheless depressed
the quarterly total markedly. These shocks had the
effect of somewhat masking the impact of the currency
appreciation. On the other hand, demand may have
outstripped domestic supply in particular sectors,
leading to the need for additional imports to make up
for the shortfall and thereby amplifying the exchange
rate effect. In this vein, the rise in imports to high levels
relative to exports of energy in 2004 likely stemmed
more from excess demand for energy in Canada than
from the appreciation of the Canadian dollar. A trend
decline in the productivity of the Western Sedimentary
Basin oil fields, temporary production problems at
extraction sites, and a vigorous rise in personal con-
sumption of gasoline would have contributed to this
excess demand. Likewise, continued depletion of min-
eral reserves in Canada and a faster rate of mine clos-
ings than openings over most of the decade up to 2004
likely contributed to a substantial rise in imports of
metal ores relative to primary metals exports in 2003
and 2004.
Competition from China
Because of its substantial cost advantage, China has
made considerable inroads in recent years, not only
in the markets for Canadian exports, but also in the
Canadian market itself, where its import share has
risen particularly rapidly with respect to M&E and
non-automotive consumer goods, partly at the expense
of the United States, Japan, and Taiwan. Chinese exports
to Canada of computer and peripheral equipment,
clothing, toys and sporting goods, audio-video equip-
ment, footwear, and communications equipment are
particularly important. Measuring the displacement
of domestic production by these exports is problem-
atic, if only because their fine product composition
may not match that of Canadian supply. Nevertheless,
it is significant that, for most of the above products,
especiallycomputersandperipheralequipment,marked
increases in the Chinese share of total supply in Canada15 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2005
Chart 10
Ratio of Canadian Imports of Non-Energy Raw
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Chart 11
Ratio of Canadian Imports of Machinery and
Equipment to Canadian Investment in and Exports
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Chart 12
Ratio of Canadian Imports of Non-Auto Consumer
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Chart 13
Ratio of Canadian Imports of Motor Vehicles to
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Imports would have been about 7 per cent below
long-term equilibrium by the end of 2004, consistent
with a more gradual adjustment to the appreciation
than exports.
A decomposition of the model predictions indicates
that the appreciation of the Canadian dollar would
have boosted import growth by about 1 percentage
point per quarter in 2003 and 2004 and accounted for
about 60 per cent of the total advance in imports over
these two years (Table 9). The rate of response of imports
to the real exchange rate changes shows a profile
similar to that of the response of exports, with a ﬁrst
peak at the end of 2003 and another one a year later
as the second wave of the appreciation started to be felt.
From the fourth quarter of 2003 onwards, however,
Chart 14
Ratio of Canadian Imports of Motor Vehicle Parts to












2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total imports 0.53 0.88 -0.60 4.75 0.27 2.74 2.92 2.00
Demand 0.84 -1.07 -0.26 3.43 -0.20 2.34 2.48 1.06
Relative prices 0.67 1.31 1.06 1.37 0.92 0.35 0.98 1.39
Residual -0.98 0.63 -1.40 -0.05 -0.45 0.05 -0.54 -0.45
Table 9
Contributions of Various Factors to Quarterly
Growth in Total Imports
Per cent
2003 2004
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
the strength of total demand in Canada would have
explained most of the vigorous expansion of imports.
The relatively modest size of the residual component
in Table 9 suggests that shocks that are unrelated to
demand components or the exchange rate, including
gains in China’s share in the Canadian market, would
have played a comparatively minor role in the evolu-
tion of imports.
From the fourth quarter of 2003
onwards,thestrengthoftotaldemand
inCanadawouldhaveexplainedmost
of the vigorous expansion of imports.
Based on the impulse-response function, the past
appreciation of the Canadian dollar would continue to
stimulate import growth during 2005, even with a
stable real exchange rate from the first quarter onwards
(Chart 16). Imports would be cumulatively raised by
the equivalent of about 1.0 per cent of GDP during 2005.
As this stimulus would diminish steadily, their expan-
Chart 15
Imports: Actual, Dynamic Forecast,
and Equilibrium Values






















1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Long-run
equilibrium
* See the footnote to Chart 7 for a deﬁnition of chained 1997 dollars.17 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2005
sion would slow down, thereby supporting economic
growth in the short term.
Conclusion
Trying to isolate the speciﬁc contribution of exchange
rate movements to the evolution of exports and imports
is fraught with risks because it is difﬁcult to properly
account for the many other factors—cyclical, structural,
and sector-specific—that affect trade flows at any
point in time. Evidence examined in this article indi-
cates that both exports and imports have adjusted sig-
niﬁcantly to the Canadian-dollar appreciation in 2003
and 2004. Model simulations suggest that this adjust-
ment should have started tapering off in the ﬁrst half
of 2005, thereby lending support to economic growth
in the short term.
The model1 relates Canadian import volumes to
components of total Canadian demand and a real
exchange rate variable, within an error-correction
framework.2 Estimation of the model over the period
1973Q1 to 2004Q4 yields the following results
(t-ratios in brackets):
(3.23) (7.53) (12.06) (8.16)
(-2.22) (3.54)
where percentage changes in imports (mt) in quarter
t are predicted by changes in domestic consumption
(ct), in investment in ﬁxed capital (it), and in exports
(xt); by the change in inventory investment relative
to Canadian GDP ; and by relative
prices as measured by the ratio of the Canadian
import-price deflator to the Canadian GDP defla-
tor .3 There is also a “correction” for the
most recent divergence of imports from their
1.    This model was developed by Jean-Phillipe Cayen, an economist in
the Research Department.
2.   A measure of global trade openness was tested but found statistically
insigniﬁcant.
3.   The movements in the relative price variable are primarily driven by
those in the nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, which feed
into the import prices estimated by Statistics Canada. They can also be
affected by changes in U.S. price indexes, commodity prices and other
factors that inﬂuence Canadian import prices and the GDP deﬂator .
mt 0.59 ct 0.37 it 0.61 xt 1.58 invt/ D ( × + D × + D × + D × = D




t) 0.10 m ( t 1 – m
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equilibrium level , governed by a
speed-of-adjustment parameter of 0.10. The equi-
librium level is determined by the long-run
cointegration relation:
(1.40) (-4.36) (0.27) (1.49) (4.51)
The magnitude of the short-run relative price elas-
ticity is similar to that in the export model, but the
size of the long-run elasticity is markedly larger,
and the speed of adjustment much slower. Again,
the sum of the long-run elasticities to ﬁnal demand
components is very close to unity.
The parameter estimates were found to be stable
over time. Statistical tests reveal that the contempo-
raneous variations in the demand components,
including the changes in inventory investment
relative to GDP, were exogenous to those in imports.
mt 1 – ( m
eq
t 1 – ) –
m
eq
t 4.24 0.90 p
m
t p
y ¤ t) 0.11 ct 0.29 it 0.61 xt. × + × + × + ( × – =
Relative price of imports 0.18 0.90
Domestic consumption 0.59 0.11
Domestic investment 0.37 0.29
Domestic exports 0.61 0.61
Table B2
Key Elasticity Estimates
for Total Canadian Imports
Short run Long run
(on impact)
Box 2
An Estimated Model of Imports
Chart 16
Effect of the Exchange Rate on Imports: Historical
Path and as Forecast by the Error-Correction Model
Per cent contribution to growth
Historical path Forecast
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